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Abstract 
Bouwma, I.M., A.L. Gerritsen, D.A. Kamphorst & F.H. Kistenkas (2015). Policy instruments and modes of 
governance in environmental policies of the European Union; Past, present and future. Statutory Research 
Tasks Unit for Nature & the Environment (WOT Natuur & Milieu), WOt-technical report 60. 42 p.; 1 Fig; 2 
Tabs; 80 Refs; 2 Annexes 
 
This report reviews the trends in EU policy instruments and governance modes. Prior to discussing these the 
report provides definitions for and describes a typology for governance modes and policy instruments. The 
report identifies three major trends in policy instruments and policy modes of the EU based on the available 
literature and a quick scan of five EU environmental directives, regulations or policies (Habitats Directive, 
Renewable Energy Directive, Timber Regulation, Water Framework Directive & Common Agricultural Policy). 
The trends are: a move from strict compulsory settings to due diligence in new legislation, a move from 
regulatory to networking, information based instruments and knowledge instruments and an increasing 
reliance on self-governance. 
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Summary 
This report provides a short overview of the current state and recent trends in policy instruments 
choice and modes of governance in a selection of environmental policies of the European Union. It 
presents a short overview of literature on modes of governance and policy instruments. The report is a 
building block of the European ‘Nature Outlook’ of the Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency. 
 
The report distinguishes between governance modes and policy instruments and is based on the 
assumption that policy instruments and modes of governance differ. Policy instruments are usually 
defined as the tools of the government for implementing their policy. Modes of governance in the 
Nature Outlook differ from policy instruments in that they are based on the coordinative principles 
behind the deployment of policy instruments, and not in relation to which actor is dominant.  
 
Five modes of governance are distinguished: hierarchical governance, market governance, network 
governance, self-governance and knowledge governance. Furthermore five major types of instruments 
are defined: legislative and regulatory instruments, economic and fiscal instruments, agreement-
based or co-operative instruments, information and communication instruments and knowledge and 
innovation instruments. These governance modes and instrument typologies are used for analysing 
five directives and regulations from the European Union in the environmental field.  
 
Based on the existing literature supplemented by a quick scan of five environmental directives and 
regulations of the European Union the following three trends are distinguished: 
 
• From strict compulsory settings to due diligence 
Recent EU Directives and regulations such as the Water Framework Directive and the Timber 
Regulation do not provide the strict command-and-control rules with strict prohibitions that marked 
many of the environmental directives and regulations developed at the end of the 20th century. 
Instead they focus on due diligence systems, which are, in short, an agreement that actors will 
comply with certain measures or procedures in order to gain the desired policy objectives. 
 
• From regulatory to networking, information based instruments and knowledge instruments 
In EU Directives and regulations over time more networking, information based instruments and 
knowledge instruments are included. This reflects a broader shift in governance modes towards 
network governance and knowledge governance. 
 
• Increasing reliance on self-governance 
The newer regulations such as the Timber Regulation and the Renewable Energy Regulation are 
examples in which the European Union shares responsibility with businesses and to a certain extent 
trusts them to realise the objectives of the European Union’s policy.  
 
The reports concludes that a successful policy uses a variety of instruments and is based on one or 
several collaborating modes of governance; from coercive public law to voluntary self-regulation, 
voluntary agreements between actors, financial and legal support and by supporting actors to engage 
in innovation trajectories. Furthermore all types of policy instruments, even the financial and 
regulatory ones, are being adapted to new modes of governance, in particular network governance 
and knowledge governance. 
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1 Introduction 
Since the mid 60-ties there has been increased attention for the decline of biodiversity in Europe and 
worldwide. The widespread degradation of ecosystems that has occurred in the 20th century also led to 
a reduction in the ability to deliver ecosystem services to society (EEA, 2015). In order to address 
biodiversity loss, the unsustainable use of ecosystems and the overall pressure on the environment, 
the European Union has since the 1970’s developed several policies on nature and the environment. 
For biodiversity, the Birds Directive (1979), Habitats Directives (1992) and the EU Biodiversity 
Strategy 2020 are the most important ones. But since 1970, both the ideas on the content of nature 
and environmental policy has changed (‘substance’) as well as ideas on who is responsible for its 
protection (‘organisation’) and in particular what the role of the government is in this respect.  
 
Currently as part of the overall Fitness check of EU legislation the Birds- and Habitats Directives are 
under review1. Furthermore recently the midterm review of the EU Biodiversity Strategy 2020 was 
completed. An important topic in these discussions is how the governance of nature policies could be 
optimized.  
 
The objective of this study is to increase insight in the range of policy instruments that have been 
developed by the EU particular of relevance for nature so far and to explore which modes of 
governance are underlying these.  
 
This report presents a short overview of literature on modes of governance and policy instruments 
which can be used for this purpose. The report specifically focusses on the various instruments and 
modes of governance used in different EU regulatory frameworks relevant to nature. In particular, the 
Habitats Directive; Renewable Energy Directive, Timber Regulation, Water Framework Directive and 
the Common Agricultural Policy. Based on the current state and recent trends expectations of how EU 
policy instruments will develop in the future are also described.  
 
By providing the overview of EU policy instruments and governance modes in the past, present and 
future this report contributes to the development of the Nature Outlook developed by the Netherlands 
Environmental Assessment Agency. The PBL’s Nature Outlook is developed on the request of the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs of the Netherlands as a contribution to the ongoing discussion on EU 
nature conservation policy. The Nature Outlook that will be published by PBL Netherlands 
Environmental Assessment Agency in 2016, presents four perspectives on European nature in 2050, 
including the pathways leading to establishing and fulfilling these perspectives. To further elaborate 
the discussion on governance of nature this project was commissioned to Alterra- Wageningen UR. 
 
Our exploration starts from the assumption that policy instruments and modes of governance differ. 
Policy instruments are usually defined as the tools of the government for implementing their policy 
(Bemelmans-Videc & Rist, 1998; Salamon, 2002). Of course private businesses and other 
stakeholders also use instruments for their management, but these are normally not named as policy 
instruments. The literature on policy instruments therefore has a bias towards public stakeholders. 
Modes of governance in the Nature Outlook differ in respect from policy instruments that they are 
based on the coordinative principles behind the deployment of policy instruments, and not on which 
actor is dominant. We distinguish between five modes of governance, being hierarchical governance, 
market governance, network governance, self-governance and knowledge governance (e.g. Dixon & 
Dogan, 2002; Considine & Williams, 2003; Van Buuren & Eshuis, 2010, Meuleman, 2008, Gerritsen et 
al, 2013) In principle every mode of governance can be applied by every type of actor.  
 
                                                 
1
 http://ec.europa.eu/environment/nature/legislation/fitness_check/index_en.htm 
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However as these governance instruments are ideal types, in practice they usually occur in combined 
forms and therefore the deployment of policy instruments is based on various coordinating principles. 
Although policy instruments differ from modes of governance, policy instruments can be related to the 
overall mode of steering, although the same instrument can have a different form in different modes 
of governance.  
 
This report has the following structure. In Chapter 2 the research method for the report is described. 
In Chapter 3 definitions of modes of governance and a classification of policy instruments is provided. 
In Chapter 4 the development of policy instruments in the EU are described based on literature review 
of the five most relevant regulatory frameworks is given. The chapter ends with description of 
signalled trends in policy instruments and expectations for the future. 
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2 Research approach 
2.1 Introduction 
The report was developed using two different methods of research, literature review, and document 
analysis. Chapter 3 and 4 are mostly based on an analysis of available literature about modes of 
governance and policy instruments in general. Additionally, in Chapter 4 an analysis was undertaken 
of a limited set of EU regulatory frameworks particular relevant for the field of nature in the EU. The 
literature and analysis formed the basis for developing ideas about how EU governance might develop 
in the future which would match with the scenarios as developed in the PBL Nature Outlook. 
2.2 Analysis approach 
2.2.1 Literature review 
A wide range of books and articles were reviewed from three different fields: governance literature, 
instrument choice and Europeanisation literature. The governance literature is based in political 
science, sociology and organisational and political economics – the latter has a history dating back to 
the 1930’s. Instrument choice as a topic for research developed in the early seventies. Main themes 
are the classification of policy instruments, which processes determine the choice of governments for 
particular instruments and what are the pros and cons of the different instruments. Europeanisation 
studies have been proliferating since the mid-1980 and have two major themes being the 
development of EU policy itself as well as how European Union policies are being put into practice by 
the Member States (Jordan & Adelle, 2014; Treib, 2014).  
2.2.2 Quick scan of EU regulatory frameworks 
A quick scan of the following five EU environmental directives, regulations or policies was undertaken: 
Habitats Directive; Renewable Energy Directive, Timber Regulation, Water Framework Directive & 
Common Agricultural Policy.  
 
Overall the regulatory frameworks of the EU can be seen as policy programs embodying overall policy 
goals as well as several policy instruments. The analysis of the regulatory frameworks was undertaken 
from an instrumental point of view. The following issues were reviewed:  
• Which policy instruments are proposed in the respective directives, regulations and frameworks? 
• Can we distinguish particular combinations of types of instruments in the regulatory frameworks in 
the environmental field and has this changed over time? 
• How is the responsibility between the European Commission, Member states, regions, businesses 
or citizens allocated in the different frameworks? 
 
The assessment was undertaken based on an analysis of the different types of instruments mentioned 
in the official text and plot these in a spider diagram. In cases in which in practice financial 
instruments are used but they are not explicitly indicated in the legal text itself they were not counted. 
The spider diagrams provide a snap shot of the predominantly used policy instruments in the given 
regulatory framework.  
 
In order to assess the types of instruments which are predominantly applied by the EU in the field of 
nature conservation or related to nature conservation we used the following main typologies of policy 
instruments (Böcher, 2012; Lascoumes & Le Gales, 2007): 
• Legislative and regulatory instruments; 
• Economic and Fiscal instruments; 
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• Agreement-Based or co-operative instruments; 
• Information and communication instruments; 
• Knowledge and innovation instruments. 
2.2.3 From analysis to design: providing input in PBL Nature Outlook 
The results of the activities under Sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 were used as inspiration and for envisaging 
the governance aspects of the four perspectives of the Nature Outlook. For, each perspective a distinct 
governance style is designed, which is constituted by elements from the different modes of 
governance and policy instruments as described in this report. For this purpose two creative 
workshops were held with the governance experts working on the perspectives. The identified 
characteristics of the modes of governance and the policy instruments were compared with the 
challenges belonging to the perspectives and it was decided which elements of the modes of 
governance and what instruments fit best for each perspective. The results of these creative 
workshops were discussed with the broader group of experts working on the Nature Outlook and 
especially in the second meeting with European stakeholders on the 17-18 March of 2015, in which 
also two of the authors of this report participated2. Designing the perspectives and their governance 
components was an iterative process with this report as a background. The results of this analysis are 
not presented in this report but will be published by PBL in the report on the perspectives itself. 
 
 
                                                 
2
 The report of this meeting can be found on : http://themasites.pbl.nl/natureoutlook/2016/wp-
content/uploads/2014/Nature-Outlook-second-dialogue-report.pdf 
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3 Theories about modes of governance 
and policy instruments 
3.1 Modes of governance 
‘Governance’ concerns “all processes of governing, whether undertaken by a government, market or 
network, whether over a family, tribe, formal or informal organisation or territory and whether 
through laws, norms, power or language.” (Bevir, 2013: 1). ‘Modes of governance’ refer to the 
underlying logic which can be recognized in governance practices. The modes of governance as used 
in this report are not characterized by the type of actor (government, business, civilians, etc.) who 
would be in the lead, but by the coordinative principles that determine its functioning. In principle, 
every actor can engage in each mode of governance. Of course in real life these modes are not applied 
in such an ideal form and hybrids are bound to exist. For analytical clarity the modes of governance 
are nonetheless very useful because the understanding of the underlying logic can clarify why 
governance processes stagnate and how they can be strengthened. 
3.1.1 Different traditions in mode of governance thinking 
The literature concerning modes of governance has (at least) two backgrounds. The first one is 
derived from political science and is rooted in the discovery that new forms of governance emerged in 
addition to the workings of the classical nation state, with its claim to protect collective goods, 
legitimised by the people, and its dependence on ‘hierarchic governance’. Scholars as Rhodes (1997), 
Stoker (1998), Pierre and Peters (2000), and Kooiman (2003) noted the emergence of new modes of 
governance in which government was not solely responsible for the provision of collective goods any 
more. The emergence of these new modes essentially was a critique on hierarchic governance and 
especially on its potential for producing societal change in complex societies and markets. This 
tradition discovered new modes of governance as ‘network governance’, ‘self governance’ and 
‘knowledge governance’.  
 
The second tradition of literature concerning modes of governance originates from economics and 
more specifically from literature about the coordination of production systems and organisations. The 
traditional distinction is that between ‘markets’ and ‘hierarchies’ (Coase, 1937; Hayek 1944). 
Hierarchy in this tradition means centrally planned coordination. Sacchetti & Sugden (2009) argue that 
although it is often assumed that markets prevail, businesses mostly govern hierarchically. This 
distinction between hierarchies and markets was expanded by introducing ‘network governance’ 
(Considine & Lewis, 2003); primarily focussing on networks of businesses, for instance between 
producers and their suppliers. Sacchetti & Sugden (2009) proposed ‘mental proximity’ as a fourth 
mode of governance, which relates to individuals engaging in deliberation. These modes more or less 
are comparable to the ones identified by the political science-tradition. Mental proximity for instance 
very much relates to knowledge governance. Only self-governance is mostly absent from this 
tradition. The economic modes of governance do provide more in depth understanding, especially of 
hierarchic governance. This tradition also learns that ‘market governance’ can be a distinct mode of 
governance.  
3.1.2 Hierarchical governance 
Hierarchical governance3 is very much related to the idea of the nation state and democratic 
government. Legitimated by public elections, government uses authority, a clear division of tasks, 
rules, rationality and objectivity (Meuleman, 2010) for intervening in society and markets. 
“Hierarchical governance rests on the assumption that it is possible to realize coordination on the basis 
                                                 
3 In literature debating the shift from ‘government’ to ‘governance’ the hierarchical mode of steering is associated with 
‘government’.   
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of power relations, on ordination and subordination. In essence, hierarchical governance is about top-
down steering. The classical bureaucratic organization is the prototype of hierarchical governance.” 
(Van Buuren & Eshuis, 2010: 286). Hierarchy is not limited to governmental governance. Firms can 
also be coordinated by hierarchies which can substitute market transactions (Coase, 1937) and in fact 
do so regularly: “... observed market economies (despite their being perceived as alternatives to 
centrally planned economies) are populated by actors whose nature is essentially based on a 
centralized and hierarchical strategic planning of activities (Cowling and Sugden 1998) in a 
mechanistic way (Burns and Stalker 1961) ...”. (Sacchetti & Sugden, 2009: 290).  
 
Hierarchic governance has been heavily criticized in political sciences: “This governance approach was 
useful for realizing collective action for a long time. But its application presupposes the availability of 
enough “capacity” for governments to realize their ambitions without the voluntary cooperation of 
their subordinates. In the context of current network societies the necessary resources to realize 
collective action (e.g. money, knowledge, organizational capabilities and legitimacy) are dispersed 
among many actors. Therefore hierarchical governance oftentimes falls short to realize collective 
action and is regularly replaced or supplemented by network governance (Pierre and Peters 2000; 
Kettl 2002; Koppenjan and Klijn 2004; Klijn and Skelcher 2008)…” (Van Buuren & Eshuis, 2010: 286).  
 
Traditionally, environmental law has been focussing itself heavily on this hierarchic (public) 
governance. A core coordinative principle in environmental law always has been the coerciveness of 
prohibitive legislation. In environmental planning, other types of governance have been scarcely 
mentioned or even been neglected in environmental law literature (Backes et al, 2006; Havekes and 
Van Rijswick, 2010). 
 
Initially, regulation in environmental law has been featured by top-down imposed and detailed – even 
rigid - norms with a prohibitive character to alter human behaviour or human attitude towards nature 
or other environmental issues. Such altering legislation could be called modification, as it tries to 
modify societal patterns. This modification legislation contrasts with re-affirmative codification, as this 
legislation only aims at consolidating an already broadly accepted and supported norms or an already 
settled-down communis opinio. Both altering legislation (modification) and consolidating legislation 
(codification) might have a strong prohibitive character and both are coercive public law instruments 
exclusively given by a (higher) public authority hierarchically governing societal entities or other 
(lower) public authorities or member states. 
 
In environmental policy, hierarchical governance by rigid prohibitive legislation is said to have been 
remarkably dominant over a long time (Backes et al., 2006). More recently however, environmental 
legislation appears to have a less rigid and precise character, as it seems to be is moving towards a 
more ‘open-textured’ and flexible norm-setting with merely due diligence codification rather than 
classic modification purposes (Ebbeson, 2010; Kistenkas, 2014a; Kistenkas 2014b). Due diligence 
refers to procedures and measures ensuring all parties involved are acting carefully (cf. operator’s 
carefulness in the recent European Union Timber Regulation) (see Section 4.2). De Sadeleer (2002) 
states that ‘postmodern’ codification of open norms or generally accepted principles ‘do not suffer 
from the burden of detail and thus allow courts to weigh and reconcile highly divergent interests with 
maximum flexibility’.  
 
Over the years, European and domestic environmental legislation has itself strongly identified with 
hierarchical governance (Backes et al., 2006), but nowadays environmental legislation seems to vary 
from codifying legislation to modifying legislation and within those types one may recognize strong 
prohibitive legislation and merely loose due diligence systems. 
3.1.3 Network governance 
Network governance (for instance Kickert et al. 1997; Rhodes 1997; Koppenjan & Klijn 2004; 
Sørensen & Torfing, 2009) refers to the interdependence of the (many) actors that are involved in 
planning and governing issues in modern societies (Edelenbosch and Teisman, 2008). These actors 
represent a range of interests and perceptions on the problems at stake, as well as on the preferred 
solutions. Network governance assumes that policy is developed and implemented in networks of 
 Policy instruments and modes of governance in environmental policies of the European Union | 17 
organizations. These networks emerge and continue to exist because actors cannot reach their 
objectives without each other (Klijn and Teisman, 2003). Network governance relies on cooperation as 
the mechanism to deal with this interdependence. It makes use of the potentials of actor networks, 
and their ability to combine multiple agenda’s and responsibilities and to distribute gains in order to 
arrive at policy outcomes. Reciprocity and collaboration are coordinative principles in network 
governance. Other coordinative principles are: interdependency, trust and empathy (Meuleman, 
2010).  
 
In this mode of governance, public and private parties usually work together as partners in coalitions, 
although networks can be found in varying forms. The coalitions that are formed are sometimes open 
and easily accessible for everybody, but they can also be closed and consist of a small coalition of 
chosen partners (Arnouts, 2010). Furthermore, Parilli & Sacchetti (2008) make a distinction between 
‘networks of direction’ and ‘networks of mutual dependence’. In networks of direction, the internal 
relationships are based on “direction and control”, and one core actor is dominant in the network 
(Parilli & Sachetti, 2008: 393). The government may well be the core actor in networks in which it 
participates. Networks of mutual dependence on the other hand, “... are heterarchical networks 
characterised by substantial participation in strategic decision making” (Parilli & Sachetti, 2008: 393). 
Our understanding of network governance is close to the networks of mutual dependence. In such 
networks, the actors in the networks make decisions together, often based on negotiating on shared 
goals. 
 
However, it should be emphasized that decision-making in networks is not necessarily easy, since the 
fact that networks develop in the first place, often indicates that there is no authoritative solution at 
hand that is acceptable for all actors at stake (De Bruijn et al., 1998). The participating actors may be 
very different in nature and act strategically. This multiplicity of actors, the various and conflicting 
interests at stake, and the strategic behaviour of actors involved, has been the reason why network 
governance has been presented as a complex series of games (Klijn and Teisman, 2003) and there 
may be winners and losers. Furthermore it can be resource intensive as it often requires frequent 
meetings. Network governance emerges when problems are complex, its processes are dynamic and 
the perceptions of the problems and solutions may shift over time, for example because the 
constellation of participants changes or new information becomes available (De Bruijn et al., 1998). 
3.1.4 Market governance  
To achieve coordination, market governance relies on the powers of the market. Competition and 
pricing decide what path is selected and where financial incentives are an important instrument (Coase 
1937; Williamson 1985). Or more elaborate: “Market governance is based upon the economic 
principles of the interplay between the demands of consumers and the supply of producers. It 
coordinates through the invisible hand of the price-based system of exchange between self-interested 
actors (e.g. Williamson 1985). Within the public domain, market principles are used to formulate 
incentives that safeguard the proper working of imperfect markets. In some cases, governments 
provide a market for goods with specific merit aspects which are not produced by the common 
market.” (Van Buuren & Eshuis, 2010: 286).  
 
In the 1980s and 1990s the idea emerged that governments should also function as if it were a 
company and by applying conditions as competition and pricing. Although this movement was very 
diverse it was labled as ‘New Public Management’ (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992; Pollitt and Bouckaert 
2000; Osborne, 2006). Pollitt (2002: 474) defined how a public sector functions in New Public 
Management: “It will be a smaller public sector, intensively focused on efficiency and continuous 
improvement. It will consist of small, core ministries (responsible for strategy) and a range of 
specialized, semi-autonomous agencies (responsible for operations). It will work within clear 
performance frameworks that specify budgets and expected results. It will make widespread use of 
market and market-type mechanisms, and will frequently work in partnership with for-profit and 
voluntary sector organizations.” 
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A relative new example of market governance from the environmental policy domain is the idea to 
price ecosystem services (e.g. payment for ecosystem services). The idea is to develop market 
mechanisms for external non-market values of the environment so that the financial incentives might 
stimulate actors to take these into account in their management decisions (Engel et al., 2008). At 
present the current price of many products does not take into account the costs of natural resources 
use or damage done- the costs are externalised. By taking these costs into account or developing a 
market mechanism for them these external costs would have to be paid by the company or other actor 
who is inflicting the damage. A possibility to create markets for these is to introduce a system of rights 
and to organise trade. The greening of the Common Agricultural Policy which has a much longer 
history can also been seen in this light. To obtain additional income support from the Commission, 
farmers would need to provide services to society, especially in environmental management.  
3.1.5 Self-governance 
Self governance is a form of governance in which ‘the capacity of societal entities to govern 
themselves autonomously’ (Kooiman 2003: 79) is the central coordinative principle. In self-
governance actors make voluntary agreements (Van Buuren & Eshuis, 2010). Self-governance is 
sometimes seen as a mode of governance which will increase its importance for the coordination of 
society (Huygen et al., 2012). Traditionally self-governance is used as a form of governance in which 
government relies on the capacities of actors from market or society to govern themselves (e.g. 
VROM-Raad, 1998; Van Montfort & Oude Vrielink-van Heffen, 2006). Self-governance can also mean 
that actors from society or market themselves claim an issue which they want to solve themselves and 
which government does not meddle in. To prevent an overlap with market governance we see self-
governance primarily as governing by societal communities (which might involve businesses). In this 
we follow authors as Blond (2010) with their focus on active communities or ‘Big Society’ as it is 
named in British politics, which in the British case is linked to attempts to reduce the size of 
government and give initiative and responsibility back to communities. This political stream is related 
to work on community building (e.g. Gilchrist, 2004; Scott, 2010). A particular type of literature 
focuses on self-governing by local communities in shared natural resources or common pool resources 
(Ostrom et al., 1994; Ostrom, 2005; Termeer et al., 2013). This school of thought criticises the notion 
that government is needed to prevent ‘tragedies of the commons’ to happen and studies what 
conditions are needed for self governance of national resources by local communities. Self-governance 
as mode of governance is less clearly described than the previous ones. This is even stronger the case 
for knowledge governance. 
3.1.6 Knowledge governance 
The governing of knowledge and learning processes has recently been proposed as a distinct mode of 
governance which cannot be reduced to one of the modes described above (Van Buuren & Eshuis, 
2010; Gerritsen et al., 2013) and of specific interest to sustainable development (Van Kerkhoff, 2014). 
What does is entail? Michailova & Foss (2009) use knowledge governance as the governance of 
knowledge management activities and this is also more or less how Stehr (2005) sees his ‘knowledge 
politics’ concept, although he also writes about the emergence of a ‘knowledge society’ (e.g. Stehr, 
2007) in which society becomes dependent on the production, dissemination and use of knowledge. In 
this report knowledge governance is understood as: ‘... purposefully organizing the development of 
knowledge in order to deal with societal problems. Knowledge governance is aimed at creating new 
insights, and innovative solutions which tempt actors to leave traditional insights and practices and 
get away from inert interaction patterns, stalemate negotiations, and interest conflicts’ (Van Buuren & 
Eshuis, 2010: 284).  
 
Knowledge governance as a concept implies that actors deliberatively engage in a learning process 
centred on knowledge development and dissemination. That is the activity by which coordination and 
collective action is organized. Knowledge governance can open up new possibilities to actors and make 
room for solutions which previously could not be thought of or were not perceived as feasible 
(Gerritsen et al., 2013). Knowledge can be seen as an alternative to network governance, because 
some problems or situations are so complex that not even network governance is able to come up 
with feasible solutions. In knowledge governance knowledge production and exchange are 
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purposefully organised around real life problems in a multi actor setting, with at its core a learning 
community which is set up by its participants who willingly participate in social learning and are aiming 
to use this to change existing policies, frames, practices, habits, etc. The results of the knowledge and 
learning process is actively shared and translated by boundary workers to non-participants of the 
learning community who may decide to use the results of knowledge governance for decision making 
or the execution of policies.  
 
The idea of ‘mental proximity’ in production networks (Sacchetti & Sugden, 2009) is also relevant to 
knowledge governance. This is grounded in economic geography and spatial economy theory in which 
proximity is traditionally a core theme. Proximity was originally seen as spatial proximity, but a social 
and organisational meaning has been added to this. Mental proximity makes it possible to achieve 
common objectives by engaging in deliberation. Gerritsen et al. (2013) see this as part of social 
learning condition. A knowledge community is needed to be able to exchange knowledge and to attach 
meanings. In organisation science these are called ‘learning networks’ (e.g. Hansen, 2002; Contactor 
& Monge, 2002).  
3.1.7 Modes of governance framework  
Each mode of governance is characterized by a distinct set of coordinative principles to achieve 
collective action (see Table 1). Each mode of governance has its strengths and weaknesses, based on 
their coordinative principles. Network governance for instance, cannot function well, when actors want 
to remain in control and mutual trust is low, market governance finds it hard to cope with market 
failures and free rider behaviour, and hierarchic governance does not function properly when 
regulations are lacking and when the allocation of tasks and responsibilities is unclear (Van Buuren & 
Eshuis, 2010). Self governance has problems with coping with outside influences, by governments 
(Ostrom, 1999) or businesses. All of these limitations limit the potential of these modes of governance 
to tackle complex policy problems. 
3.2 Policy instruments 
3.2.1 Policy instrument research 
The study into policy instruments started in the 1970’s. Although different definitions of policy 
instruments exist, most of them start from the premises that policy instruments are developed by the 
government as a way to implement their policies and influence the behaviour of citizens and 
businesses ( Howlett, 1991; Bemelmans-Videc & Rist, 1998). Due to changing views of the role of the 
government and society in policy implementation also views on policy instruments have broadened in 
order to account for situations in which network governance or knowledge governance dominates 
(Gunningham et al., 1998; Jordan et al., 2005; Lascoumes & Le Gales, 2007). 
 
Policy instruments are sometimes depicted as neutral devices. Governments can select a broad array 
of policy instrument to implement their policy based on considerations regarding effectiveness or 
efficiency (Salamon, 2002). However in practice their choice is often limited due to their embedding in 
a larger framework of established modes of governance and policy regime logics (Howlett, 2009; 
Gossum et al., 2010; Böcher, 2012). Furthermore over time governments tend to develop a 
preference for specific instruments e.g. policy instrument mixes referred to as implementation styles 
(Kagan and Axelrad 1997; Howlett 2002 and 2005).  
 
Often policy instruments, as are modes of governance, are described in their ideal form – however in 
practice many hybrids exist. The following instruments are commonly distinguished in different 
typologies (Vedung, 1998; Jordan & Adelle, 2014; more ref) being 1) legislative /regulatory 
instruments, 2) economic/fiscal instruments, 3) agreement based/co-operative instruments, and 4) 
(traditional) information/communication based instruments. Additionally in this report we distinguish: 
5) knowledge instruments. Although one could argue that knowledge instruments are akin to 
information and communication instruments, the focus is different. Central in these knowledge 
instruments is that they aim to develop shared knowledge between actors and promote innovation. 
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Unlike the more traditional information and communication instruments, they are not one-way but 
two-way communication. They are not about the government of a government agency that brings a 
message but about shared knowledge development. 
 
In Section 3.2.2 these instruments are described in more detail and in Table 1 examples of these 
instruments in the EU policy are given. 
3.2.2 Legislative and regulatory instruments 
Legislative and regulatory instruments are used to denote a broad variety of laws and regulations. 
Their main characteristic is that a public authority sets binding requirements, which in cases of non-
compliance will be followed by sanctions. Government apply “command-and-control” principles to 
influence actors' behaviour. The requirements can either be prohibitive (e.g. forbid certain behaviour) 
or be prescriptive (e.g. require certain behaviour). Overall the approach of the EU – in particular in 
environmental policy – has been based on legislative and regulatory instruments. Examples of EU 
legislative and regulatory instruments are provided in Table 1.  
 
The most obvious mode of governance which is related to these instruments is hierarchical 
governance. However the approach to these instruments has changed over time. Initially they 
contained strict prohibitions and assessments, but nowadays they can also contain more loose due 
diligence systems prescribing some corporate carefulness or merely process rules. Different reasons 
underlie the choice for these types of instruments. First of all they have the advantages that they 
enforce stakeholders to comply even if they do not want to, as such they do not rely on the free co-
operation of the targeted actor (high degree of coerciveness). Also they apply equally to all targeted 
actors and protect them from arbitrary governmental decisions (rule of law). Furthermore they 
improve the predictability of governmental actions. However there are also disadvantages to such 
types of instruments. Often there is considerable reluctance towards selecting these instruments on 
side of actors involved. One of the reasons for this reluctance is that often the costs to comply are 
paid by the involved actors (externalisation of costs). In case of high noncompliance, the cost of 
enforcement on the side of the government will be high. Furthermore they have a limited ability to 
cope with complex dynamic situations and do not stimulate stakeholders to commit themselves to 
policy objectives. 
3.2.3 Economic and fiscal instruments 
Economic and fiscal instruments are based on a government that influences market mechanisms 
though for instance subsidies, loans, taxes, concessions of rights. The most logical mode of 
governance is market based. Furthermore for a majority of these instruments, compliance has a more 
voluntary character as they simulate the involved actor to act in a certain way by rewarding or 
financially discourage certain behaviour.  The advantage of these instruments is that they have a 
potential to correct market failure in particular in respect to common goods for which markets do not 
exist. The usage of economic and fiscal instruments in principle can create the economic conditions for 
the establishment of functioning markets. However the possibilities to create and manage these 
market failures with financial instruments is extremely difficult. Disadvantages are the costs 
associated with the subsidies. Loans or taxes themselves require coordination programs to distribute 
or collect the money. Also financial incentives can prevent compliance for other reasons, such as 
intrinsic motivations. Also the competition for the funds between stakeholders can lead to high 
transactions costs and much frustration on their side.  
3.2.4 Agreement-Based or cooperative instruments  
Agreement based or co-operative instruments are those instruments in which the government and/or 
involved actors jointly and on a voluntary basis decide to behave in a certain way. They often arise 
from consortia that share an agenda – mostly consisting of both public as well as private actors 
(public-private partnerships). Often the agreements reached between the parties (whether 
governmental or not) are fixed in a covenant code or agreement. Advantages are that these 
instruments are completely voluntary and that actors use them because they rely on one another to 
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achieve anything. These instruments are related to network governance and are suited for situations 
in which resources are divided among multiple actors, and are therefore quite complex.  
 
In general there will be limited resistance towards the instrument on side of actors involved, although 
this depends on how open or closed the networks are in which agreement is being sought. Actors who 
are not included in these agreements could very well oppose these instruments. Disadvantages can be 
that they have a low level of coerciveness – because it has not been arranged that if parties do not 
upheld the agreement sanctions can follow. Of course, voluntary agreements can be formalized with 
contracts which do include penalties. Agreement based instruments often have high transaction costs 
because they take a long and intensive process to be employed. These instruments also might lead to 
unclear division of tasks and responsibilities, which can cause all kinds of conflicts and can limit their 
potential to bring about change. 
3.2.5 Information and communication instruments 
These instruments try to influence behaviour through disseminating information to actors on certain 
issues in the hope that this will entice them to change their behaviour. It therefore is limited to one 
way communication. These instruments can target a broad audience and use media as a way to reach 
people (publicity information campaigns) for instance campaigns against smoking. However they can 
also consist of targeted educational programs to reach a specific audience (group lessons, individual 
coaching) or providing product related information through certification (labeling) or ranking. 
Whichever approach, all instruments are voluntary as people can decide to ignore them. This is also 
the main disadvantage of these instruments; information does not lead to compliance in a direct way; 
only indirectly. Furthermore it might be difficult to reach non-interested parties because they are not 
searching for information or follow other logical frameworks than the regulator (information has little 
meaning to them).  
 
Of course, recently there are also more interactive communication instruments, such as direct 
dialogue, interactive workshops, and invitation of sharing opinions and viewpoints between 
governments and communities. These instruments are on the boundary of information and knowledge 
instruments (see at Section 3.2.6). 
3.2.6 Knowledge and innovation instruments  
Knowledge based instruments are those instruments in which participating actors jointly increase their 
knowledge by engaging in social learning. In these instruments knowledge is both information and 
capacity to act and therefore includes bot tacit and explicit knowledge. Examples of such instruments 
are developing communities of practice (exchanging best practice), living labs, creative workshops, or 
pilots (e.g. legal pilots by means of environmental law experiments, or trying out new technologies), 
and constructing business cases or land use plans. A benefit of these instruments is the limited 
resistance on the side of the involved actors and that they can cope with situations that are complex 
and dynamic.  
 
Actors might be enthusiastic to participate as it might provide them with new insights and capabilities. 
These instruments also may lead to actual new ideas which have a better chance of succeeding than 
previously considered policy measures. A disadvantage is that these instruments might primarily 
benefit a small group of front runners or might only appeal to actors that belong to a certain 
community. The instruments require a high level of co-operation and a shared identity between the 
actors involved. In case this is absent, the instrument might not work as actors might not be able to 
reflect on their own viewpoint and learning does not occur due to a ‘knowledge fight’ between different 
epistemic communities. The transaction cost will even be higher than at the agreement based 
instruments, because innovation is a labor intensive process with a high chance of failure. These 
instruments therefore are primarily relevant for stagnating processes in which knowledge or 
capabilities are lacking. 
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Table 1  
Examples of EU policy instruments in the environmental field (based on Jordan & Adelle, 2014 and this 
study) 
Legal and 
regulatory 
instruments 
Financial and 
economic 
Agreement based Information/ 
communication 
Knowledge 
instruments 
• Habitats Directive 
assessment (Art 
6.2 of the Habitats 
Directive) 
• Due diligence 
systems (Art. 6 of 
the EU Timber 
Regulation) 
• Requirements for 
drinking water (Art. 
4 of Water 
Framework 
Directive) 
• Agri-environmental 
subsidies (1992-
now) 
• EU Upper and 
lower limit for 
national fuel taxes 
• Emissions trading 
• Voluntary Car 
emissions in 
Automotive 
industry 
(1999/2000) 
• Requirement for 
stakeholder 
inclusion in 
European Water 
Framework 
Directive 
• Eco-labelling 
• Energy labelling for 
houses 
 
• European 
Innovation 
Partnership on 
Agricultural 
Productivity and 
Sustainability 
• Horizon 2020 
innovation and 
research programs 
• Joint Programming 
initiatives 
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4 Past, present and future 
4.1 Policy instruments and modes of governance of the 
European Union 
The European Union over time has developed a broad array of different instruments to implement 
their policies4 (Adelle & Jordan, 2014). In his report we primarily focused on directives and 
regulations. We will show that even these are maybe less ‘regulatory’ in nature as their name might 
imply. For example, most of the reviewed directives and regulations also include proposals for 
economic instruments.  
 
Reason to focus on regulations and directive are that these are binding for the Member States 
compared to the non-binding instruments that the European Union also develops (see Annex 2). 
Particular in the field of environment many directives set strict legal requirements (Adelle & Jordan, 
2014). Initially, policy focused on regulating technical standards for environment and nature (EEA, 
2015). In 1992 with the reform of the Common Agricultural Policy also financial incentives became an 
important mechanism as agri-environmental measures became an obligatory part of the Common 
Agricultural Policy.  
 
In the Green paper ‘on market based instruments for environmental policy purposes‘ the European 
Commission further explored the use of market- based instruments for the environment. More recently 
the EU started to develop and promote new instruments for its environmental policies which were 
more based on network, knowledge and agreement based modes of governance (Schout et al., 2010). 
As a result the policy mix of the EU has broadened considerably (EEA, 2015). Nevertheless the use 
and development of economic, agreements based instruments the EU way of operating remains to a 
large extent regulatory in nature (Adelle & Jordan, 2014). 
 
We want to review whether these general trends also can be discerned in the development of nature 
related directives and regulations. Therefore five regulatory frameworks of the EU were reviewed that 
have a high impact on nature: the Habitats Directive, the European Water Framework Directive, the 
Timber Regulation, the Renewable Energy Directive and the Common Agricultural Policy. These 
frameworks combined, in our expectations, would represent the total variety of European policies, 
relevant to nature. 
4.2 Results of the analysis of regulatory frameworks for 
nature 
Based on the text of the respective regulation an overview was made of the types of instruments 
which are mentioned in the texts of the directives and other regulations In Annex 1 an overview is 
given of the respective article and the types of instruments mentioned. In cases in which in practice 
financial instruments are used but they are not explicitly indicated in the legal text itself they are not 
counted. 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 See Annex 2 for a description of the most important EU policy instruments in this study 
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Figure 1. Overview of types of instruments mentioned in the Directives and regulations (see Annex 1) 
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The spider diagrams in Figure 1 depict the various policy instruments present in the regulatory 
frameworks that were analysed. The analysis demonstrates the previously mentioned trend (which we 
will present in more detail in Section 4.3) in environmental policies to move away from regulation in 
the 1990s towards other ways to achieve coordination, mainly with a focus on finances, information 
and agreement between actors at the end of the 2010’s (Schout et al., 2010; Jordan & Adelle, 2014; 
EEA, 2015).  
 
However although this trend is apparent, all frameworks propose or incorporate different types of 
policy instruments. None of the Directives, policies or regulations features only one type of 
instrument. But remarkable differences exist. If we look at the dominant instrument or instruments 
proposed in the Directive or regulation we can see that in the Habitats Directive regulatory 
instruments are dominant. In the Water Framework Directive information based instruments are 
dominant and, after the latest revision of the Common Agricultural Policies, a mix financial and 
regulatory instruments and knowledge based instruments are dominant. In the Renewable Energy 
Directive financial and information instruments are dominant and in the Timber Regulation financial 
and agreement based instruments are dominant. Striking is also the presence of agreement based 
instruments in four of the five frameworks. Although new modes of governance and instruments 
emerged in European environmental policies, legislation is still a very important one.  
 
In the scanned directives we did not yet find many knowledge instruments (as innovation programs, 
research projects, exchange of best practices, creative contests, etc.), except for the Common 
Agricultural Policy. Although the EU is promoting, (co-)funding and programming research and 
innovation (Horizon 2020, EIT, EIP, JPI’s ), they are only not mentioned in most directives. 
4.3 Trends 
The results of our study show three trends in EU policy which are in line with those mentioned in 
governance literature, instrument choice literature and EU policy studies being: a movement from 
compulsory settings towards ‘due diligence system’ (DDS); a movement from regulatory to 
information and agreement based instruments and an increasing reliance on self-governance.  
These three trends are discussed in more detail below. 
From strict compulsory settings to due diligence 
In Dutch law literature Havekes and Van Rijswick (2010) have already argued a new approach in EU 
environmental law starting with the Water Framework Directive. This new approach is featured by 
more flexibility, less coercion and more programmatic obligations. It is indeed true environmental 
legislation started with a highly coercive directive like the Birds Directive (1979) and the Habitats 
Directive (1992), moving forward towards a mere programmatic approach in the Water Framework 
Directive(2000) and Renewable Energy Directive (2009) and from thereon to a due diligence approach 
of the recently made European Timber Regulation (2013).  
 
In the two decades since the EU Habitats Directive came into force, the most recently made European 
legislation relevant for nature apparently does no longer rely on determining specific settings, but 
leaves us au contraire with more open norms. 
 
This DDS demands risk assessment and mitigation procedures as well as measures and procedures 
providing access to information concerning the operator’s supply of timber or timber products on the 
market. So DDS asks compliance of market operators and is merely procedural whereas the Habitats 
Directive provides specific settings to which Member States need to adhere to. The conservation 
objectives of the Natura 2000 site should be met and national authorities may not agree to a plan or 
project likely to have a significant effect on these conservation objectives (Article 6 Habitats 
Directive). The recent Galway bypass case (European Court of Justice , ECJ C-258/11 [2013]) and the 
Rijksweg A2-case (ECJ C-521/12 [2014]) re-confirms the small margin of discretion to member states 
when applying the habitats assessment (Borgstrom and Kistenkas 2014; Kistenkas 2014). The Water 
Framework Directive, however, basically consists of a program towards good ecological potential 
(GEP) of all European waters. This GEP appears to be a long-term procedure and process with room 
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for discretion and many derogation possibilities for Member states rather than a strict norm or rigid 
assessment (De Boer et al., 2010). 
 
Open-textured Due Diligence system provides more room for systems developed in partnership with 
involved parties. Businesses might, for instance, use private certification schemes in their risk 
assessment procedures, but they might also rely on CITES5 permits or FLEGT6 licensing. Operators are 
free to choose their assurance of compliance. Though privately held certification as FSC or PEFC is not 
granted the same status as FLEGT licenses or CITES permits, it is still recognized to play a role. So 
new instruments as partnerships (Visseren-Hamakers, 2013) are embedded and recognized in this 
new regulation,  
 
Whereas the Habitats Directive and its habitats assessment impose EU law on domestic law in a quite 
top-down way, the Timber Regulation merely follows and adopts domestic law (more bottom-up), as 
legal timber is defined as timber being in compliance with the domestic law of the country where it has 
been harvested (Tuomasjukka, 2013). It also follows FLEGT Voluntary Partnerships Agreement (VPA) 
outcomes as FLEGT-licensed timber is eo ipso legal. Every country that has concluded VPA 
negotiations has its definition of legal timber set out in its own VPA and this is the operator’s reference 
as they assess and mitigate risk as part of DDS. This is in line with a more bottom-up approach 
recently favored in EU policy. 
 
As said above the EUTR demands a procedural approach of risk reduction measures (Due Diligence) 
rather than a normative approach. Here we might perhaps distinguish a move from strict public law 
norm-setting (HBD) to less coercive instruments like self-regulation, private law and programmatic 
voluntarism (Kistenkas, 2013; Borgstrom and Kistenkas, 2014). 
 
Table 2 
Overview of differences between the 5 reviewed  directives and regulations 
 Legislation In 
force 
since 
Central focus Legal 
technique 
Coercive-ness Margin of 
Member 
States 
discretion 
Habitats 
Directive 
EU Directive 1992 Regulation, 
Assessment 
Compulsory 
settings 
(conservation 
objectives) 
High 
coerciveness 
(top-down) 
Small margin 
of discretion to 
member states 
Water 
Framework 
Directive 
EU 
legislation 
2000 Planning Goal setting Highly 
coerciveness 
(intermediate 
between top-
down, bottom- 
up) 
Medium margin 
of discretion to 
member states 
Renewable 
Energy 
Directive 
EU 
Regulation 
2009 Information 
Financial 
incentives 
Goal setting Medium Medium margin 
of discretion to 
member states 
Common 
Agricultural 
Policy -
revision 
2014 
EU 
Regulation 
2014 Financial 
incentive, 
knowledge/net
work 
 Cross 
compliance 
Conditional 
payments 
Medium to low Large margin 
of discretion to 
member states 
European 
Timber 
Regulation 
EU 
Regulation 
2013 Due diligence carefulness 
(DDS) 
Low 
coerciveness 
(bottom-up) 
Large margin 
of discretion of 
operators 
                                                 
5 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora; see: https://www.cites.org/ 
6 Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade; . http://www.euflegt.efi.int 
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This is also true for the Common Agricultural Policy that has removed many market restrictions and 
increasingly provides incentives for innovation and for producer collaboration. It is basically the move 
from a strict command-and-control with strict prohibitions to a loose due diligence, which is, in short, 
an agreement that actors (whether public or private) will comply with certain measures or procedures 
with some risk management rather than strict prohibitions.  
 
Table 2 illustrated five interesting differences in respect to legal technique, coerciveness and margin of 
secretion. between the related legislative entities. 
From regulatory to networking, information based instruments and knowledge instruments 
Another difference is the acceptance of concurring regulation of private and public law (Heyvaert 
2012; Kistenkas 2013) in the Timber Regulation. By accepting private law, agreement based 
instruments developed between private parties are acknowledged by the government.  
 
Partnerships are de iure irrelevant in current Natura 2000-law (Habitats Directive) whilst they are 
more recognized in the Water Framework Directive and even more in the Common Agricultural Policies 
in the European Timber Regulation. In the European Timber Regulation, modern partnerships as 
privately held certification schemes are no longer ignored. As both European Timber Regulation and 
FSC and PEFC aim at sustainably produced timber, the regulatory concurrence is de iure about 
identical goals. Their competitiveness lies merely in the origin of the regulations: it is public law from 
the EU and private law given by forest certification organizations. The purpose and content of the 
regulations might be concurring, but they are not necessarily contradictory. They might indeed 
support each other and the EUTR seems to be the first nature regulation to fully recognize this. 
 
Currently forest regulation comes from all levels of government; from international and European to 
national and subnational and perhaps even local, but also from public to private as there is also 
regulatory competition among privately held certification organisations. In contemporary 
environmental law it is becoming common to engage in regulatory competition and concurring 
legislation (Heyvaert, 2012) and privatisation (Reid, 2011). Mutually supportive regulation consists of 
economic, education and information but also of self-regulation and voluntarism as well as of course 
classic command and control regulation (Gunningham et al. 1998; Howlett and Rayner 2004; Schout 
and Jordan 2005; Van Gossum et al., 2008; Van Gossum et al., 2012; Rehbinder, 2012).  
 
In line with scientific discussions on the emergence of Informational governance (e.g. Mol, 2006) we 
see a clear rise in the reliance on information provisioning. Informational governance concerns the 
governance changing effects of data and information and how information and data can be used to 
support policies. The Birds and Habitats Directives, The Water Framework Directive, the Timber 
Regulation and the Renewable Energy Directive use monitoring, which is an information instrument. 
All frameworks use information instruments to some extent. Actors are required to provide information 
on what they do and what it contributes to. The Commission may or may not decide on other actions, 
based on this information, but to some point rely on this information to form an opinion on what is 
happening.  
 
The governing of knowledge and learning is increasingly noticed as an emerging mode of governance, 
which is particularly relevant to sustainable development issues (Gerritsen et al., 2013; Van Kerkhoff, 
2013). Knowledge governance concerns the purposeful organisation of knowledge production and 
knowledge exchange, with at its core a learning community which is set up by its participants who 
willingly participate in social learning and are aiming to use this to change existing practices. The 
results of the knowledge and learning processes are actively shared and translated by boundary 
workers to non-participants of the learning community who may decide to use the results of 
knowledge governance for decision making or the execution of policies. Knowledge instruments are 
primarily applied in the Common Agricultural Policy, which mentions the European Innovation Program 
on Agricultural Productivity and Sustainability, and certain Joined Programming Initiatives (such as 
FACCE). These knowledge instruments are mostly not explicitly coupled with nature policies. Although, 
there is much research being done on habitats and green infrastructure, (co-)funded by the European 
Commission. The biogeographical seminars for Natura 2000 do involve learning and knowledge 
sharing. 
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Increasing reliance on self-governance 
The newer regulations as the Timber Regulation and the Renewable Energy Regulation can also be 
seen as examples in which the European Union to some point trusts businesses to establish objectives 
of the European Commission. This is also true for the greening of the Common Agricultural Policies. 
Financial incentives are used to stimulate companies to comply. This makes it understandable why 
regulations become less directive and limit themselves to types of monitoring. Self-governance in the 
European Union is more focused on market actors (companies, sectors), than on local communities.  
4.4 Concluding remarks 
A successful policy uses a variety of instruments (Howlett, 2009) and is based on collaborating modes 
of governance; from coercive public law to voluntary self-regulation, voluntary agreements between 
actors, financial and legal support and by supporting actors to engage in innovation trajectories. 
Regulation nowadays will not only be classic ‘command-and-control’ public law but also less coercive 
private law and voluntary partnership agreements. Adopting dual or hybrid approaches relying both on 
conventional ‘command-and-control’ and private regulation could perhaps lead easier to the 
accomplishment of sustainability goals. Problem solving could be pursued at all levels of the political 
spectrum, from local to global, but also beyond, by private environmental regulators (Visseren-
Hamakers and Pattberg, 2013). Although the European policy instruments have and will maintain a 
strong regulatory character, we can expect that the signalled trends towards a due diligence approach 
and agreement based instruments will continue. This means that  the EU will rely on a certain level of 
self-governance by businesses and in which governance more or less is limited to agreements, to 
information gathering and (to managing) knowledge development and dissemination. 
 
For financial, agreement based, knowledge and information instruments there are also new 
applications emerging. Information for instance is increasingly used for certification of private or 
societal initiatives. Not only so governments can check their viability, but for instance also to enable 
consumers to make informed decisions in their behaviour as consumers. Knowledge instruments 
increasingly are used to enable multi actor networks (public, private, societal) to explore new ways of 
working and valorisation and deriving policies from what they want and need. Knowledge no longer is 
the exclusive domain of universities, schools and specialized institutes, but something which is 
engrained in commercial and societal practice.  
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Annex 1 Overview of the instruments included in the reviewed 
frameworks 
Policy instrument/ 
reviewed framework 
Legislative and regulatory 
instruments 
Economic and fiscal 
instruments 
Information and 
communication instruments 
Agreement- based 
instruments 
Knowlegde and innovation 
instruments 
Habitats Directive 1. Art. 6 (habitats assessment, 
assessing plans or projects 
affecting significantly 
conservation objectives of 
the Natura 2000-site ) 
2. Art. 12 (species protection; 
prohibitions protecting 
animals) 
3. Art. 13 (species protection; 
prohibition plants) 
4. Art. 16 jo art. 15 (species 
protection; derogation) 
5. Art. 23 (duty of implement-
ation into domestic law) 
1. Co-financing (member-states 
and European Commission 
jointly finance) ex art. 8  
1. Art. 16 (member-states 
reporting derogations to the 
Commission) 
2. Art. 17 (member-states 
reporting every 6 years) 
Not relevant 1. Art. 18 (member are obliged 
to do research) 
Water Framework 
Directive 
1. Article 3 (Coordination of 
administrative arrangements 
within river basin districts). 
2. Article 4 (1) ( objectives for 
surface waters, ground 
waters, protected areas) + 
article 10, 11, 12, 13, 16, 17. 
 
1. Article 9 (1) (principle of 
recovery of the costs of 
water services) 
 
1. Article 5 (1) (analysis of 
characteristics, the impact of 
human activity and economic 
analysis) 
2. Article 6 (1) (register of 
areas which have been 
designated as requiring 
special protection) 
 
1. Article 14 (1) active 
involvement of all interested 
parties) 
 
Not in directive: 
1. Guiding documents and 
technical reports 
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Policy instrument/ 
reviewed framework 
Legislative and regulatory 
instruments 
Economic and fiscal 
instruments 
Information and 
communication instruments 
Agreement- based 
instruments 
Knowlegde and innovation 
instruments 
3. Article 7 (1) ( identification of 
water bodies used for the 
abstraction of water 
4. Article 8 (1) (monitoring of 
water status) 
5. Article 15 (1) (river basin 
management plans and all 
subsequent updates)  
6. Article 18 (1) (report on the 
implementation of the 
Directive)   
 
Not in directive: 
7. Online information exchange 
platform CIRCA  
 
Renewable Energy 
Directive 
1. Art, 13. 4 Requirement to 
use energy from renewable 
resources in new buildings 
and major renovated 
buildings 
2. Art 18.1 requirement for  
economic operators to use a 
mass balance system  
3. Art 17. Raw material for 
biofuel shall take into 
account sustainability criteria  
 Art. 3 support schemes such as  
1. investment aid 
2. tax exemptions or reductions 
3. tax refunds 
4. renewable energy obligation 
support schemes including 
those using green 
certificates, 
5. direct price support schemes 
including feed-in tariffs and 
premium payments 
1. Art 14. 1 information on 
support measures available 
for relevant actors 
2. Art 14. 2information on the 
net benefits, cost and energy 
efficiency of equipment and 
systems for the use of 
heating, cooling and 
electricity from renewable 
energy sources is made 
available either by the 
1. Art 7, art 9 co-operation 
between Member States, 
Member States and third 
countries 
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Policy instrument/ 
reviewed framework 
Legislative and regulatory 
instruments 
Economic and fiscal 
instruments 
Information and 
communication instruments 
Agreement- based 
instruments 
Knowlegde and innovation 
instruments 
supplier of the equipment or 
system or by the national 
competent authorities 
3. Art 14.3. -Guidance on 
options to relevant actors (  
4. Art 14. 4. Ensure that 
certification schemes or 
equivalent qualification 
schemes become or are 
available  
5. Art 14.5 Develop awareness-
raising, guidance or training 
programss ] 
6. Art 14. 6. Ensure that a 
guarantee of origin can be 
provided.  
Timber Regulation 1. Article 19:  obligation to set 
up penalties  
 
Not relevant 1. Art. 13 (member states may 
facilitate the exchange of 
information) 
2. Art. 12  section 2  
(competent authorities 
cooperate to exchange 
information on shortcomings) 
3. Art. 20 (member states 
report two yearly to the 
commission on the 
application of the regulation) 
4. Art. 6 (Due Diligence; 
operator’s carefulness) 
1. Art. 3 (FLEGT and CITES 
licenses are valid under due 
diligence as well) 
2. Art. 6 (private certification 
schemes such as FSC and 
PEFC,) 
3. Art. 12 section 1  
(cooperation) (competent 
authorities cooperating with 
each other to ensure 
compliance with the 
regulation 
 
1. Art. 8 lid 1 sub b (monitoring 
authorities shall monitor and 
evaluate the Due Dilligence 
Systems) 
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Policy instrument/ 
reviewed framework 
Legislative and regulatory 
instruments 
Economic and fiscal 
instruments 
Information and 
communication instruments 
Agreement- based 
instruments 
Knowlegde and innovation 
instruments 
 
Common Agricultural 
Policy 
1. 1308/2013 - Article 8 and 
Article 20 (rules on market 
intervention) 
2. 1306/2013 Article 58 
(adopting legislative, 
regulatory and administrative 
provisions) 
3. 1306/2013 - Article 94 
(ensuring environmental 
conditions) 
 
1. 1307/2013 (direct payments)  
2. 1308/2013 - Article 1 (1) 
(common organisation of the 
markets) 
3. 1308/2013 / 1305/2013 – 
article 6 (support for rural 
development) 
 
1. 1306/2013 - Article 48 
(access to information) 
2. 1306/2013 - Article 48 
(access to documents) 
1. 1305/2013 – article 26 
(setting up of producer 
groups and organisations) 
1. 1305 / 2013 - article 14 
(knowledge transfer and 
information actions) 
2. 1305/2013 – article 55 (EIP 
for Agricultural Productivity 
and Sustainability) 
3. 1306/2013 – article 110 
(common monitoring and 
evaluation framework) 
4. 1306/2013 - article 15 
(advisory services) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Policy instruments and modes of governance in environmental policies of the European Union | 39 
Annex 2 Policy instruments of the 
European Union 
Source: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/eu_action_cfsp.html 
 
 
European legal instruments 
 
Regulations 
A "regulation" is a binding legislative act. It must be applied in its entirety across the EU. For example, 
when the EU wanted to protect the names of agricultural products coming from certain areas such as 
Parma ham, the Council adopted a regulation. 
 
Directives 
A "directive" is a legislative act that sets out a goal that all EU countries must achieve. However, it is 
up to the individual countries to decide how. This was the case with the working time directive, which 
stipulates that too much overtime work is illegal. The directive sets out minimum rest periods and a 
maximum number of working hours, but it is up to each country to devise its own laws on how to 
implement this. 
 
Decisions 
A "decision" is binding on those to whom it is addressed (e.g. an EU country or an individual company) 
and is directly applicable. For example, when the Commission issued a decision fining software giant 
Microsoft for abusing its dominant market position, the decision applied to Microsoft only. 
 
Non-binding instruments 
 
Recommendations 
A "recommendation" is not binding. When the Commission issued a recommendation that pay 
structures for financial-sector employees should not encourage excessive risk taking , this did not 
have any legal consequences. A recommendation allows the institutions to make their views known 
and to suggest a line of action without imposing any legal obligation on those to whom it is addressed. 
 
Opinions 
An "opinion" is an instrument that allows the institutions to make a statement in a non-binding 
fashion, in other words without imposing any legal obligation on those to whom it is addressed. An 
opinion is not binding. It can be issued by the main EU institutions (Commission, Council, Parliament), 
the Committee of the Regions and the European Economic and Social Committee. While laws are being 
made, the committees give opinions from their specific regional or economic and social viewpoint. For 
example, the Committee of the Regions issued an opinion on how regions contribute to the EU’s 
energy goals  
 
White paper  
White Papers are documents containing proposals for Community action in a specific area. In some 
cases they follow a Green Paper published to launch a consultation process at European level. When a 
White Paper is favourably received by the Council, it can lead to an action programme for the Union in 
the area concerned. 
 
Communications  
Communication usually set out a Commission action plan in a specific policy field. Relevant 
communication for nature are the Communication on EU Biodiversity Strategy to 2020  and the 
communication on Green Infrastructure. 
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